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FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 
EUGENE VOLOKH* 
I. Introduction 
Should American states bar the use of foreign law in American courts? 
This question has arisen throughout the country, most prominently in 
Oklahoma, which in 2010 enacted an unusually broad ban on such use of 
foreign law.1 This ban was later struck down by the Tenth Circuit on the 
grounds that part of the ban singled out Islamic law for special restriction.2 
That, though, was a narrow objection, which the legislature could easily 
deal with by just banning foreign law without mentioning Islamic law. 
Indeed, after the Tenth Circuit decision, Oklahoma enacted just such a 
narrower restraint on the use of foreign law by Oklahoma courts, as have 
other states.3 Still more state legislatures have considered the issue, and it 
remains under consideration in some.4 
I’m particularly interested in discussing the question because the 
initiatives that restrict the use of foreign law have mostly come from the 
political right, and I generally come from there, too. I’m a conservative. I 
support free markets. I support gun rights. I vote Republican. And I’m 
skeptical of some of the internationalist impulses that often come from the 
left. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (volokh@law.ucla.edu). 
Many thanks to the University of Oklahoma College of Law for inviting me to give the 
Henry Lecture in March 2013, and to Judge Robert Henry for his help and hospitality; this 
article is based on that lecture. 
 1. See H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010). 
 2. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 3. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 4. See infra notes 66 and 67. 
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But I also think the criticism of the use of foreign law in the American 
legal system misses some important matters, and the proposed solutions to a 
real but relatively minor problem may cause much more serious problems 
instead.5 And the problems that these proposals would cause should 
concern most Americans, without regard to ideology. They would be 
practical problems for American businesses and individuals, affecting the 
everyday functioning of our legal and economic systems.  
We shouldn’t embrace every attempt to introduce foreign law into the 
American legal system, but neither should we rush to reject foreign law 
generally. There are times when American law does, and rightly should, 
call for reference to foreign law, and there are times when it should not. (In 
an article in the following issue of this law review, I say something similar 
about the use of religious law in the American legal system.)  
II. The Controversy over Using Foreign Law in Determining the Meaning 
of U.S. Constitutional Provisions 
The controversy over the use of foreign law to interpret the U.S. 
Constitution has appeared at various times in American history, but it most 
recently sprung up about ten years ago, in a trio of constitutional cases: 
Atkins v. Virginia,6 Lawrence v. Texas,7 and Roper v. Simmons.8  
Atkins interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause as barring execution of mentally retarded murderers.9 
The Atkins majority’s analysis discussed many reasons why the majority 
viewed punishment of the mentally retarded as “cruel and unusual,” but a 
footnote mentioned foreign law in passing: “Moreover, within the world 
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved. Brief for 
European Union as Amicus Curiae 4.”10 This wasn’t much by way of 
reliance: foreign law was cited as the third of the four sources of authority 
that the footnote mentioned (the others being the views of associations of 
psychologists, the views of various religious groups, and survey results). 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign 
Law, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 59 (2009), for an excellent analysis of this issue. 
 6. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 8. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 9. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.  
 10. Id. at 316 n.21 (citations omitted). 
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Nonetheless, it understandably drew criticism, especially from Justice 
Scalia’s dissent.11 
The following year, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a ban 
on homosexual sex, overruling the 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick decision.12 In 
the process, the Court included this passage to explain why it was rejecting 
Bowers: 
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in 
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of 
Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. Other nations, too, have taken 
action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. 
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There 
has been no showing that in this country the governmental 
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more 
legitimate or urgent.13 
Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence in Bowers, it turns out, had itself 
mentioned foreign law in the course of rejecting a right to sexual autonomy, 
arguing that such a rejection had been the general view of western legal 
systems since time immemorial.14 Lawrence then, in passing, responded to 
Chief Justice Burger by saying that, to the extent his Bowers opinion relied 
on values we shared with our wider civilization, we should recognize that in 
recent decades this wider civilization has rejected those values.15 So again 
the reference was relatively fleeting, though again it understandably drew 
criticism from the dissent.16 
Two years later, the Court once more looked to foreign law in 
interpreting our Constitution. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court interpreted 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as barring the execution of 
murderers who had committed their crimes before they turned eighteen.17 
Here, though, the analysis was considerably more detailed: 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
 13. Id. at 576-77 (citations omitted). 
 14. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 15. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77. 
 16. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
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Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the 
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the 
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the 
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our 
responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court’s decision 
in Trop [v. Dulles], the Court has referred to the laws of other 
countries and to international authorities as instructive for its 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel 
and unusual punishments.”  
 As respondent and a number of amici emphasize, Article 37 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which every country in the world has ratified save for the United 
States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition on capital 
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18. No 
ratifying country has entered a reservation to the provision 
prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders. Parallel 
prohibitions are contained in other significant international 
covenants. 
 Respondent and his amici have submitted, and petitioner does 
not contest, that only seven countries other than the United 
States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and China. Since then each of these 
countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or 
made public disavowal of the practice. In sum, it is fair to say 
that the United States now stands alone in a world that has 
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty. 
 Though the international covenants prohibiting the juvenile 
death penalty are of more recent date, it is instructive to note that 
the United Kingdom abolished the juvenile death penalty before 
these covenants came into being. The United Kingdom’s 
experience bears particular relevance here in light of the historic 
ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth 
Amendment’s own origins. The Amendment was modeled on a 
parallel provision in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, 
which provided: “[E]xcessive Bail ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/1
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inflicted.” As of now, the United Kingdom has abolished the 
death penalty in its entirety; but, decades before it took this step, 
it recognized the disproportionate nature of the juvenile death 
penalty . . . . 
 It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting 
in large part on the understanding that the instability and 
emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in 
the crime. The opinion of the world community, while not 
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions. . . . 
 It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride 
in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of 
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply 
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.18 
Even with this extended discussion in Roper, it is not quite clear how 
much the three decisions were actually affected by foreign law. The 
majority in each case gave many reasons for its decision, so it seems quite 
likely that each of the Justices would have reached the same conclusion 
even without considering foreign law. And there is a longstanding tradition 
of relying on foreign law in determining the scope of American 
constitutional law;19 whatever is going on here is not some sharp break with 
traditional American practice. 
Nonetheless, it is understandable that using the views of foreign 
governments as authority for determining the constitutional rights of 
Americans has aroused much opposition. American traditions related to 
constitutional rights differ considerably from those of foreign nations, even 
the nations of Europe and the Anglosphere.  
American views about the right to bear arms are one example.20 
American views about broad protection for free speech, including racist and 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. at 575-78 (citations omitted). 
 19. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign 
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 752-53 (2005); see also, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1 (1953); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 
(1884); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). 
 20. Stephen G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the 
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (2006). 
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antidemocratic speech, are another.21 The same is true of constitutional 
doctrines that have generally appealed more to liberals than conservatives: 
American views on abortion rights, the separation of church and state, and 
the exclusionary rule are considerably more constraining of the government 
than are European views.22 
Of course, courts routinely rely on many sources, including law review 
articles or professional groups (as in the Atkins footnote). The authors of 
those works likewise weren’t elected or appointed by Americans to make 
law for Americans.  
But foreign law is law, and seemingly an expression of public sentiment 
in allied and respected countries, not just the views of a few academics or 
even of a professional association. Judges therefore may well be more 
likely to view foreign law as having moral authority. Judges may find the 
arguments of law professors to be persuasive, and they may find the factual 
claims of professors who have studied certain fields to be credible. But they 
will rarely view the opinions of law professors as having significant 
normative authority, especially in deciding whether to strike down a statute. 
Yet the material quoted above, especially the quote from Roper, suggests 
that the Court viewed international practice as normatively authoritative. 
And it’s quite sensible to worry that the Court’s attention to international 
law could lead to a reduction in individual rights and not just a broadening 
of those rights. Consider, for instance, the prediction of Professor Peter 
Spiro, a supporter of the greater use of international law in the American 
legal system: 
[T]his analysis [supporting the use of international law in 
American courts] supplies a normative basis for national 
decisionmakers to rebalance rights. To take the concrete case, an 
international norm against hate speech would supply a basis for 
prohibiting it, the First Amendment notwithstanding. 
 C. Insinuating International Law 
 It is unlikely in the extreme that the treatymakers would 
undertake such a frontal assault against the supremacy of 
constitutional rights given the clear current lack of constitutional 
authorization to constrain rights on international law 
grounds . . . .  
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. at 1405. 
 22. Id. at 1405-10. 
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 The analysis is not, however, irrelevant to current 
constitutional practice, for it also justifies putting international 
regimes to work in the context of constitutional interpretation. 
This use of international regimes has been engaged. In U.S. 
courts, those asserting rights are no longer embarrassed to 
deploy international law arguments, as they once were. The 
United States Supreme Court is regularly subjected to such 
arguments, especially from amici (including foreign government 
amici). International law is becoming part of the vocabulary of 
American constitutional law. Although its doctrinal place 
remains unsettled, international law appears poised to make 
unprecedented inroads in the making of American constitutional 
law [giving Atkins v. Virginia as an example]. . . . 
 This battle is now being fully engaged, on academic, judicial, 
and policy fronts. Deploying international law as an interpretive 
tool reflects a defensive strategy, ostensibly a process of 
domestication rather than one of submission. This may mask 
what is, in fact, a partial displacement of constitutional 
hegemony. International law may be a process in which the 
United States and U.S. entities participate, but it is not a creature 
of the Constitution. On the other hand, resistance and insulation 
may no longer be viable options. One can expect more frequent 
deployment of international norms as part of the domestic rights 
discourse. In the long run, international norms may be played, 
not merely as persuasive agents, but as trumps. 
 Constitutional rights have presented a discursive bulwark 
against the encroachment of international law. The continuing 
refusal to contemplate the international determination of rights 
betrays the embedded nationalist orientation of constitutional 
theory, and the field of foreign relations law proves to be no 
exception. These nationalist assumptions may be conceptually 
vulnerable in the face of the changing architecture of 
international law and community. Constitutional rights have 
bowed to the treaty power and the exigencies of foreign relations 
as a matter of historical practice, even as the inviolability of 
domestic rights interpretation has been set as a matter of 
constitutional faith. Accompanying doctrines of constitutional 
hegemony, deviations notwithstanding, were justified in a world 
in which law offered no protection of individual rights. As the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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regime of international human rights grows thick, however, that 
justification should no longer stand unchallenged. As 
transnational society develops a common rights culture, one in 
which the disaggregated United States enjoys a voice, the 
supremacy of international rights may be normatively 
sustainable. In the short term, this argues for the relevance of 
international norms in domestic constitutional interpretation. In 
the long run, it may point to the Constitution’s more complete 
subordination.23 
Professor Spiro’s reasoning suggests that there is cause to be concerned, I 
think, about the use of foreign law in defining American constitutional 
rules. 
At the same time, even Justice Scalia, who has sharply criticized reliance 
on foreign law in this context, has concluded that it is proper to use foreign 
law in some contexts. One example is Schriro v. Summerlin,24 which dealt 
with whether certain expansions of the right to a jury trial (expansions that 
Justice Scalia endorsed25) should be applied retroactively on habeas review. 
Under the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, such retroactive application 
of a procedural rule would be justified only if it is a “‘watershed rule[] of 
criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of 
the criminal proceeding.”26 And the expansion of the jury trial right, Justice 
Scalia held (in an opinion joined by the four other conservative Justices), 
was not such a watershed rule, partly because 
for every argument why juries are more accurate factfinders, 
there is another why they are less accurate. The [dissent below] 
noted several, including juries’ tendency to become confused 
over legal standards and to be influenced by emotion or 
philosophical predisposition. Members of this Court have opined 
that judicial sentencing may yield more consistent results 
because of judges’ greater experience. Finally, the mixed 
reception that the right to jury trial has been given in other 
countries, though irrelevant to the meaning and continued 
existence of that right under our Constitution, surely makes it 
implausible that judicial factfinding so “seriously diminishe[s]” 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1999, 2025-28 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 24. 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 25. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610-14 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 26. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
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accuracy as to produce an “‘impermissibly large risk’” of 
injustice. When so many presumably reasonable minds continue 
to disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we 
cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously 
diminishes accuracy.27 
So even Justice Scalia is sometimes willing to consult foreign law in 
crafting American legal rules. He reasons that such consultation is improper 
when determining the “meaning and continued existence” of a 
constitutional right. But it is just fine, he concludes, when a court is 
considering other questions, such as the nonconstitutionally mandated rules 
of habeas corpus. 
I tentatively agree with Justice Scalia’s view that it’s not sound to define 
the meaning of American constitutional rights with reference to foreign 
views of such rights. The problem, though, is that there is little that state 
legislatures can do about this. State law cannot directly bind the U.S. 
Supreme Court in its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. And while state 
law might at times indirectly influence the Court, by sending a message that 
some American institutions disapprove of the use of foreign law, such 
effects are likely to be slight. 
III. Choice of Law Rules in Nonconstitutional Adjudication 
On the other hand, while the benefits of bans on the use of foreign law 
are likely to be small, the costs could be grave. Foreign law is routinely 
used in American courts, not just in esoteric contexts like the one in Justice 
Scalia’s Schriro opinion, but in routine matters applying existing American 
legal rules related to family law, contract law, tort law, evidence law, and 
the like.28 Those American legal rules (such as “choice of law” rules) often 
expressly call for the consideration of foreign law. Let me offer a few such 
examples. 
A. Family Law 
Consider, for instance, Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, a 2008 Louisiana case.29 
The Ghassemis were first cousins born in Iran.30 They married in Iran in 
1976 and had a son born in Iran in 1977.31 The husband then came to the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 356 (citations omitted). 
 28. See Yeazell, supra note 5, at 61-62. 
 29. 2207-1927 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/15/08); 998 So.2d 731. 
 30. Id. p. 4, 998 So.2d at 734. 
 31. Id. p. 2, 998 So.2d at 733. 
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United States to study, while the wife and son stayed behind.32 The husband 
remained in America, and in 1995 arranged for the son to join him in 
America.33 The wife also eventually came to America, and in 2006 she 
petitioned for divorce from the husband.34 
To rule on the divorce petition, Louisiana courts first had to determine 
whether the Ghassemis were validly married. It turns out that Louisiana, 
like about half the other states, bars marriage between first cousins.35 If the 
Ghassemis had tried to get married in Louisiana, their marriage would not 
have been valid.36 
But the Ghassemis had married in Iran, not in Louisiana. And in such a 
situation, Louisiana law expressly provides that Louisiana must look to the 
law of the place where the marriage was entered into: “A marriage that is 
valid in the state [defined to include foreign countries] where contracted . . . 
shall be treated as a valid marriage unless to do so would violate a strong 
public policy of [Louisiana] . . . .”37 This is a common legal rule in 
American states, stemming from longstanding principles favoring the 
validity of marriages: 
Based on the universally espoused policy of favoring the validity 
of marriages if there is any reasonable basis for doing so (favor 
matrimonii), this Article authorizes the validation of marriages 
that are valid either in the state where contracted or in the state 
where the spouses were first domiciled as husband and wife. . . . 
This ancient policy of favor matrimonii and favor validatis is 
well entrenched in the substantive law of every state of the 
United States.38 
The Louisiana court therefore looked at Iranian law to determine if the 
Ghassemis were validly married. The court concluded that first cousin 
marriages were valid under Iranian law, and therefore the Ghassemis were 
validly married for purposes of Louisiana law.39 The court did not refuse to 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. p. 3, 998 So.2d at 734. 
 35. Id. p. 16, 998 So.2d at 742. 
 36. Id. p. 16, 998 So.2d at 742-43. 
 37. Id. p. 9, 998 So.2d at 738. 
 38. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520, cmt. (b) (2013)). 
 39. Id. p. 26, 998 So.2d at 749-50. 
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follow Louisiana law by applying Iranian law. Rather, it applied Iranian law 
because Louisiana law so required.40 
Moreover, the Louisiana court also looked to European law, Mexican 
law, and Canadian law: 
Furthermore, we note that marriages between first cousins are 
widely permitted within the western world. “Such marriages 
were not forbidden at common law.” Additionally, no European 
country prohibits marriages between first cousins. Marriages 
between first cousins are also legal in Mexico and Canada, in 
addition to many other countries. 
 Actually, the U.S. is unique among western countries in 
restricting first cousin marriages. Even so, such marriages may 
be legally contracted in [nineteen states] . . . . An additional six 
states . . . also allow first cousin marriages subject to certain 
restrictions.41 
Yet this too is just the application of Louisiana law, rather than the 
replacement of Louisiana law with foreign law. Recall that the Louisiana 
statute provides that foreign marriages are recognized “unless to do so 
would violate a strong public policy of the state.”42 A “strong public policy” 
must be something more than just a policy against entering into a certain 
kind of marriage in Louisiana—the whole point of the statute, after all, is to 
validate some marriages that could not have been validly entered into in 
Louisiana.  
Rather, a “strong public policy” must be something stronger. In the 
words of the Ghassemi court, the question is whether, “although Louisiana 
law expressly prohibits the marriages of first cousins, such marriages 
are . . . so ‘odious’ as to violate a strong public policy of this state.”43 
Looking at how such marriages are treated by sister states within the United 
States and by other countries within our Western culture, can help tell us 
how “odious” our culture generally sees such marriages as being. And the 
uniform recognition of such marriages in Europe and among our North 
American neighbors, coupled with the recognition of such marriages in half 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. p. 11, 998 So.2d at 739-40. 
 41. Id. p. 25, 998 So.2d at 748-49 (citations omitted). 
 42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520(A) (2013). 
 43. Ghassemi, p. 26, 998 So.2d at 749-50. 
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the states, suggests that the marriages are indeed not contrary to a “strong 
public policy” in Louisiana.44 
But what about polygamous marriages? What about same-sex marriages? 
Well, that’s where the “strong public policy” exception might come in. 
American courts that have considered the question have indeed concluded 
that polygamous marriages are contrary to American public policy.45 (Note 
that one basis for so deciding is that polygamous marriages are not 
recognized in the United States or in most European countries.) And 
Louisiana law expressly provides that same-sex marriages are against 
Louisiana public policy and thus invalid, even if entered into elsewhere.46 
So if a foreign marriage is seen as sufficiently improper by state courts or 
the state legislature, it need not be recognized; but many other foreign 
marriages are recognized by states even if they could not be lawfully 
entered into in those states. 
And the Louisiana statute makes sense. I think it makes sense as to the 
definitions of which marriages are recognized: Whatever one might think of 
the merits of first cousin marriages, if those cousins have married—whether 
in Iran or Tennessee—it seems wrong to render them unmarried when they 
come to Louisiana, whether to live or to visit. 
But beyond this, surely the determination of what is needed to be 
married must turn on the law of the place of marriage and not on the law of 
Louisiana. Louisiana law, for instance, requires a Louisiana marriage 
license, plus a 72-hour waiting period.47 Unsurprisingly, people who marry 
in Iran or Canada or England won’t comply with Louisiana formalities. 
Why would they even have thought to comply with them? 
Then, when they come to Louisiana—perhaps many years later—and 
there is a question of whether they are married for Louisiana law purposes, 
Louisiana courts shouldn’t just say, “You didn’t get a Louisiana license and 
wait 72 hours when you thought you got married, so therefore you aren’t 
married.” Louisiana courts instead need to inquire into whether the couple 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id.  
 45. See, e.g., Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Mass. 2012). 
 46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520(B) (2013). Of course, if the Supreme Court eventually 
concludes that the Constitution mandates equal recognition of same-sex marriages, then this 
provision of the Louisiana Civil Code would be invalidated, and Louisiana would have to 
recognize foreign same-sex marriages. But Louisiana would then also have to allow same-
sex marriages within Louisiana itself; it wouldn’t be foreign law that requires recognition of 
out-of-state same-sex marriages, but federal constitutional law that requires recognition of 
all same-sex marriages. 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:241 (2013). 
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was properly married under the laws of the place where they married, just 
as the Louisiana statute provides.48 
B. Evidence Law and Family Status 
The same is true when other bodies of law, such as evidence law, turn on 
people’s marital status. For example, suppose Heinz and Wilhelmina are a 
couple, and Heinz is accused of a crime in Oklahoma. May Wilhelmina be 
compelled to testify about what Heinz told her? Well, Oklahoma law 
provides that, if the two are married, then Heinz may prevent Wilhelmina 
from testifying about any confidential communications that the two 
shared.49 
Say, though, that Heinz had been married before, to his ex-wife Erica. 
So, to figure out if Heinz and Wilhelmina are married, a court must decide 
whether Heinz and Erica were properly divorced. And say the purported 
divorce and marriage happened in Austria, and Heinz and Wilhelmina are 
visiting Oklahoma (whether for business or pleasure).  
To determine whether the marriage and the divorce were proper, 
Oklahoma courts can’t ask whether the couple complied with American 
marriage law or divorce law. Of course the divorce didn’t comply with 
American divorce law. Why should it have? It stemmed from an Austrian 
proceeding, which followed Austrian rules. When Heinz divorced and 
remarried, he never expected to be in America many years later.  
So Oklahoma courts would turn, as in Ghassemi, to the standard rule of 
family law, which is to determine the validity of a marriage or a divorce by 
applying the law of the jurisdiction where either took place.50 There is 
nothing particularly radical about such rules. But if Oklahoma courts cannot 
consider foreign law, how can they possibly make these marital status 
decisions that are needed to apply American law?  
Again, it is American law that says a spouse may not testify about 
confidential communications. And it is American law that says whether a 
person is married or divorced is to be determined under the law of the 
jurisdiction where the marriage or divorce took place. But applying this 
American law requires courts to consider Austrian law. 
                                                                                                                 
 48. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3250 (2013). 
 49. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2504(B) (2011). 
 50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283(2). 
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C. Contract Law 
Consider also contract law—to be concrete, consider Campbell v. 
American International Group, Inc., a 1999 Oklahoma case.51 Christopher 
Campbell (a Louisiana resident) was injured in an accident while riding in a 
car driven by Michael Muller (an Oklahoma resident).52 Both men were 
American soldiers, and the accident happened in Germany, where they were 
stationed.53 Muller’s auto insurance was issued in Germany by a French 
corporation.54 
After the men returned to the United States, Campbell sued Muller and 
Muller’s insurance company in Oklahoma court.55 Insurance cases are 
primarily contract cases, so the court had to decide which law to use in 
interpreting the contract.56 And the court concluded, reading the insurance 
policy, that the policy incorporated German law—unsurprising for a policy 
sold in Germany.57 
I don’t think there should be anything controversial about such use of 
foreign law. We Americans are part of the big world and we go all over it, 
whether as soldiers, businesspeople, or tourists. When we travel we might 
enter into a contract. Then, after we come back, and a dispute arises, we 
may want the benefit of suing in American courts, which are more 
convenient for us.58 
American courts give us this benefit of suing locally, but that doesn’t 
mean those courts should apply local state law to a contract the parties 
never anticipated would be governed by that state law—a contract that was 
entered into and largely performed in a foreign country. Among other 
things, it would be bad for American business if Germans knew that a 
contract signed in Germany, which they would normally expect to be 
governed by German law, would be interpreted using American law 
regardless of any choice-of-law contract provision. Any such always-use-
                                                                                                                 
 51. 1999 OK CIV APP 37, 976 P.2d 1102. 
 52. Id. ¶ 2, 976 P.2d at 1103. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. ¶ 3, 976 P.2d at 1103. 
 56. Id. ¶ 19, 976 P.2d at 1107. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Of course, this assumes that those courts have jurisdiction over the defendants. See, 
e.g., id. ¶¶ 13-18, 976 P.2d at 1106-07 (finding there was such personal jurisdiction for 
various reasons, including that the insurance company had deliberately marketed its policies 
to an international clientele). 
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American-law rule would lead many foreigners to avoid doing business 
with Americans or to charge more for doing business with Americans.  
So as a result, it makes perfect sense for a court in a case such as 
Campbell to use German law. And, again, that is simply the application of 
American choice of law rules, which in this instance call for reference to 
German law. 
D. Tort Law 
Or consider tort law.59 Let us say a Canadian (Don) injures an 
Oklahoman (Paul) in Canada, and then Don moves to Oklahoma before a 
lawsuit is filed, perhaps because he works at Devon Energy Corporation 
and was transferred to its Oklahoma office.60 Paul sues Don in Oklahoma, 
where the plaintiff and defendant both now live and where defendant’s 
assets are now located. Generally speaking, in such a case Oklahoma courts 
would apply Canadian law.61 
For example, let us say the injury happened in an automobile accident, 
and Paul claims that Don was driving unreasonably. We would naturally 
want to see if Don was violating traffic laws. Which traffic laws? Canadian 
traffic laws. We wouldn’t ask if Don was driving in violation of an 
Oklahoma traffic law while driving in Canada.  
The same would be true for other types of tort law, or if an Oklahoman 
injured a Canadian in Canada, rather than vice versa. There are complicated 
choice of law questions as to which laws should apply in certain 
situations.62 But in many situations it’s clear that the proper application of 
choice of law rules requires foreign law to be applied.  
                                                                                                                 
 59. See also Yeazell, supra note 5, at 62. 
 60. Devon is a very large company in Oklahoma and in Canada. 
 61. See, e.g., Edwards v. McKee, 2003 OK CIV APP 59, 76 P.3d 73 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2003). Edwards involved the law of another state (Kansas), not another country, but the 
choice of law analysis is much the same in either situation. The court applied the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, which provides that “[t]he rules in the 
Restatement of this Subject apply to cases with elements in one or more States of the United 
States and are generally applicable to cases with elements in one or more foreign nations.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10. The Restatement also notes that 
“[t]here may, however, be factors in a particular international case which call for a result 
different from that which would be reached in an interstate case,” but that would generally 
not arise in a typical accident case. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Pate v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1982 OK CIV APP 36, 649 P.2d 809 
(determining whether Oklahoma law would apply to an Arkansas auto insurance contract’s 
subrogation clause when the accident occurred in Oklahoma). 
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If the option of applying Canadian law were eliminated, Oklahoma 
courts would have two alternatives. First, they could apply Oklahoma law, 
even though the accident happened in Canada. For the reasons mentioned 
above, that would be unwise. It would be unfair to the litigants, who were 
understandably expecting that they should follow Canadian rules of the 
road and not Oklahoma rules of the road. And it would likely produce 
tension with foreign countries, which would be bad for businesses that 
employ many Americans. 
Second, Oklahoma courts could just refuse to decide the case and insist 
that the case instead be decided by Canadian courts. “We cannot apply 
Oklahoma law,” these hypothetical courts would say, “because this case 
involves a Canadian accident. And we cannot apply Canadian law because 
that would be considering foreign law and that would be bad.”  
But is this what Oklahomans really want? Oklahomans should, I think, 
prefer that they have an opportunity to litigate in their own state, rather than 
having to travel to another country to sue. So instead of just refusing to 
decide cases that are based on out-of-state events, or applying Oklahoma 
law where it would clearly be inapt, Oklahoma courts apply choice of law 
principles—principles that are not the invention of some liberal law 
professor, but have existed throughout American history.63 
E. The Law of Judgments 
Let me offer a final example: the law of judgments. Imagine that an 
English corporation tries to enforce an English judgment in Oklahoma 
against an Oklahoma corporation.  
American businesspeople wouldn’t want foreign judgments to be 
unenforceable against their businesses. If that were to happen, nobody 
would deal with American businesses in the first place. Why would 
Englishmen do business with Oklahomans if they know they can’t 
effectively sue and collect judgments if the deal goes sour? Because 
businesses would suffer if foreign money judgments could not be collected, 
Oklahoma law (like the law of American states more generally) provides 
that foreign money judgments can be enforced in Oklahoma courts.64 But 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC (1834). Joseph Story was one of the most prominent legal scholars and Supreme 
Court Justices of the early 1800s, likely second only to Chief Justice John Marshall in 
stature. 
 64. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 718.3 (2011). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/1
2014]        FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 235 
 
 
Oklahoma law also requires, understandably, that the judgment be final and 
enforceable “[u]nder the law of the foreign country where rendered.”65  
So, to determine whether our hypothetical English judgment can be 
enforced in Oklahoma courts, a court would need to look to the law of 
England, the foreign country where it was rendered—the court would need 
to determine whether the judgment is final and enforceable under English 
law. This, then, is yet one more example where American law rightly 
requires American courts to consider foreign law. 
IV. Attempts to Restrict the Application of Foreign Law 
A. The Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment 
The examples in Part III help show why the Oklahoma “Save Our State” 
Amendment was misguided. That amendment provided, in relevant part: 
[Oklahoma courts], when exercising their judicial authority, shall 
uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States 
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States 
Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, 
established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules 
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of 
another state of the United States provided the law of the other 
state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. 
The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or 
cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international 
law or Sharia Law.66 
The Amendment would thus have forbidden Oklahoma courts from 
considering foreign marriage law, foreign contract law, foreign tort law, 
and foreign judgments law. Oklahoma courts would have been unable to 
effectively tell whether foreigners were married or whether foreign 
judgments were enforceable, and would have been forbidden from applying 
foreign contract law or foreign tort law. (Similar bills were proposed but 
not enacted in Alabama, Arizona, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Wyoming.67) 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(C) (emphasis added), permanently enjoined by Awad v. 
Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2013).  
 67. S.B. 44, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013); H.B. 2379, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2010); S.B. 308, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); S.J. Res. 14, 50th Leg., 
2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2012); S.B. 444, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011); S.B. 
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The Tenth Circuit struck down the Oklahoma Amendment on the 
grounds that it violated the First Amendment by singling out Islamic law 
(Sharia law) for special prohibition.68 I’m not sure this was right,69 but the 
decision helped Oklahoma dodge a bullet. I don’t think the drafters of the 
“Save Our State” Amendment consciously intended to break the well-
established and useful choice of law rules in the kinds of cases I described 
above, and keeping the Amendment would have been bad for Oklahoma 
citizens and Oklahoma businesses. In any event, Oklahoma and other states 
should avoid broad foreign law bans such as those in the “Save Our State” 
Amendment, whether or not the bans also single out Islamic law. 
Of course, critics might ask, “What if the foreign law is horrible? What if 
it calls for cutting off people’s hands?” Fortunately, though, not a single 
court decision applying foreign law enforces any such foreign regime. 
Existing choice of law rules contain many tools that ensure American 
courts do not apply a foreign law that is sufficiently against American 
public policy.70  
And in any event, even those tools only need to be invoked in a tiny 
fraction of all cases. Most of the foreign commercial, family, and tort law 
applied in American courts is compatible with American public policy. In 
such cases, we do want American courts to “look to the legal precepts of 
other nations.” 
B. The “American Laws for American Courts” Model 
1. Generally 
After the first wave of proposed foreign law bans—exemplified by the 
“Save Our State” Amendment—legislatures turned to considerably 
narrower proposals, mostly based on the American Laws for American 
Courts (ALAC) framework. 
                                                                                                                 
1639, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); H.J. Res. 0005, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); 
see also H.B. 597, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); S.B. 62, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 
2011); S. 1387, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010); H.B. 1240, 82d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 68. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 69. See Eugene Volokh, Tenth Circuit Says Oklahoma Anti-Sharia Law Is Likely 
Unconstitutional, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 10, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.volokh. 
com/2012/01/10/tenth-circuit-says-oklahoma-anti-sharia-law-is-likely-unconstitutional/.  
 70. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971) (“[T]he factors 
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include . . . (b) the relevant policies of the 
forum, [and] (c) the relevant policies of other interested states . . . .”). 
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The ALAC proposal wouldn’t bar the use of all foreign law, but focuses 
instead on barring the use of 
[any] law, legal code or system that would not grant the parties 
affected by the ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, 
rights, and privileges granted under the U.S. and [State] 
Constitutions, including but not limited to due process, freedom 
of religion, speech, or press, and any right of privacy or marriage 
as specifically defined by the constitution of this state.71  
Any state that implements the ALAC proposal commits its court system 
to not aiding or participating in litigation under such laws or in such legal 
systems: 
• “Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency ruling or 
decision [based on such a law] shall . . . be void and 
unenforceable . . . .”72 
• “A . . . contractual provision . . . which provides for the choice of 
[such] a law . . . shall . . . be void and unenforceable . . . .”73 
• “A . . . contractual provision . . . which . . . grant[s] the courts or 
arbitration panels in personam jurisdiction over the parties 
shall . . . be void and unenforceable if the jurisdiction chosen” 
would implement such a law.74 
• “If a resident of this state, subject to personal jurisdiction in this 
state, seeks to maintain litigation, arbitration, agency or similarly 
binding proceedings in this state and if the courts of this state 
find that granting a claim of forum non conveniens or a related 
claim violates or would likely violate the fundamental liberties, 
rights, and privileges granted under the U.S. and [State] 
Constitutions of the non-claimant in the foreign forum with 
respect to the matter in dispute, then it is the public policy of this 
state that the claim shall be denied.”75 
The ALAC proposal is also limited in that it excludes claims brought by 
“a corporation, partnership . . . or other legal entity that contracts to subject 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Model ALAC Act, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/ 
legislation/model-alac-bill/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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itself to foreign law in a jurisdiction other than this state or the United 
States.”76 The proposal has been enacted in Kansas and Oklahoma,77 and 
has been proposed in many other states.78 
In some respects, this proposal is unobjectionable and even valuable. For 
instance, the proposal bars the enforcement of foreign judgments that are 
based on what in the United States would be constitutionally protected 
speech. This fits well with the 2010 federal SPEECH Act, which bars the 
enforcement in American courts of foreign libel judgments when the 
foreign law rests on speech that would be protected under the First 
Amendment.79 The ALAC proposal would provide similar protection for 
foreign judgments based on invasion of privacy, insult, and other causes of 
action involving speech that would be protected by the First Amendment in 
American courts. 
But there are two substantial problems with the proposal. 
2. Trial by Jury in Civil Cases 
First, the trial by jury in many civil cases has often been labeled as a 
“fundamental right” under state constitutions.80 Though it has sometimes 
not been viewed as “fundamental” under the federal Constitution, which is 
why the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against the states,81 
other federal cases do label it as “fundamental.”82 But the ALAC proposal 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.B. 1060, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Okla. 2013). 
 78. S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011); H.B. 1037, 2012 Leg., 112th 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); S.B. 1962, 2012 Leg., 112th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); S.B. 308, 96th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); S.B. 201, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011); H.B. 
296, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).  
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2012). 
 80. See, e.g., Morales v. City of Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City Police Dep’t, 
2010 OK 9, ¶ 7, 230 P.3d 869, 874 (“The use of summary process may not be extended to 
swallow triable issues of fact. Inclusion of the latter within that process would violate a 
party’s fundamental right either to a trial by jury at common law or due process by orderly 
trial before a court in equity.”); Gard v. Sherwood Constr. Co., 400 P.2d 995, 1002 (Kan. 
1965) (“The right of every individual citizen to a trial by jury is of ancient origin . . . . [It] is 
regarded as a basic and fundamental feature of American jurisprudence, and has since the 
organization of our government been incorporated in the form of expressed guaranties in the 
constitutions of both state and federal governments. It is a substantial and valuable right and 
should never be lightly denied.”). 
 81. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010). 
 82. E.g., Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) (“The right of jury trial 
in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal 
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applies to legal systems “that would not grant the parties affected by the 
ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges 
granted under the U.S. and [State] Constitutions.”83 Courts may reasonably 
read this provision as covering any fundamental right granted under state 
constitutions—which would cover the right to civil jury trial—as well as 
any fundamental right granted under the federal constitution.84 
Read literally, then, pretty much all foreign judgments entered against 
individuals would be unenforceable under the ALAC proposal simply 
because those judgments were entered without a civil jury trial. (Civil jury 
trials are virtually never available outside the United States.85) After all, 
such a judgment does “not grant the parties affected by the ruling or 
decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted 
under the U.S. and [State] Constitutions [i.e., the civil jury trial]”—and 
therefore “shall . . . be void and unenforceable.”86 
Such refusal to enforce foreign civil judgments is bad for international 
commerce. It also seems unnecessary—while the civil jury trial has a long 
                                                                                                                 
jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and 
sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should 
be jealously guarded by the courts.”); Lyon v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 305 
U.S. 484, 492 (1939) (“While litigants in federal courts cannot—by rules of procedure—be 
deprived of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
the local Arkansas rule followed by the District Court does not result in such deprivation. . . . 
It is essential that the right to trial by jury be scrupulously safeguarded, and a state rule of 
procedure entrenching upon this right would not require observance by federal courts. 
However, this Arkansas procedural rule—so closely approximating the federal rule—does 
not amount to a prohibited invasion of federal rights.”); Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935) (discussing “clauses of the 
Constitution which guarantee and safeguard the fundamental rights and liberties of the 
individual, the best examples of which, perhaps, are the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, 
which guarantee the right of trial by jury”); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 
(1830) (“The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. . . . As soon as the 
constitution was adopted, this right was secured by the seventh amendment of the 
constitution proposed by Congress; and which received an assent of the people so general, as 
to establish its importance as a fundamental guarantee of the rights and liberties of the 
people.”). 
 83. Model ALAC Act, supra note 71 (emphasis added). 
 84. Courts might, I suppose, read it as covering all those rights that are secured by both 
constitutions, but that seems a less likely reading. 
 85. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 112 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that 
“the right to a jury in civil actions . . . has never taken hold in the civil law world,” and even 
in the common law world outside the United States, “the civil jury has been abolished”). 
 86. Model ALAC Act, supra note 71. 
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American history and plausible arguments in its favor, I don’t think the 
absence of a civil jury is especially likely to make a trial unfair.87 Indeed, 
American law generally doesn’t call for civil juries in injunction cases, 
restitution cases, family law cases (except in Texas), admiralty cases, and 
more.88 
To be sure, ALAC’s effect, for good or ill, is limited by the exclusion of 
cases lost by business organizations that contracted for the application of 
foreign law in a foreign jurisdiction.89 Still, the ALAC proposal would 
render unenforceable foreign judgments against American individuals.90 
And it would render unenforceable foreign judgments against American 
companies when the judgments rest on foreign tort claims (claims as to 
which there will generally be no contract providing for decision by the 
foreign jurisdiction), such as basic negligence claims or intentional physical 
injury claims.91 I’m not sure whether this is an intended effect of the 
proposal. But in any event, it seems to me to be a problem. 
3. Foreign Marriages and Divorces from Countries in Which Family 
Law Discriminates Based on Sex or Religion 
The second problem with the ALAC model arises with regard to people 
who married or divorced overseas and who then to the United States. Say, 
for instance, that Wanda purportedly married Xavier in Elbonia, then 
purportedly divorced him in Elbonia. Then she purportedly married Harry 
in Elbonia, and ten years later came to America. The American legal system 
now has to figure out whether Wanda is indeed properly married to Harry. 
Such questions come up all the time in immigration law, divorce law, wills 
and trusts law, tax law, evidence law, and many other contexts. To figure 
out the answer, it may be necessary to decide whether Wanda’s earlier 
Elbonian divorce was valid—which can only be determined using Elbonian 
law—or possibly just to give legal effect to her earlier Elbonian divorce. 
But what if the Elbonian legal system doesn’t take the same view of 
various rights, including equality rights, that the United States now takes? 
What if, for instance, Elbonian law provides husbands more rights than 
wives in initiating divorces?  
                                                                                                                 
 87. See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355-56 (2004). 
 88. Gary T. Sacks & Neal W. Settergren, Juries Should Not Be Trusted to Decide 
Admiralty Cases, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 163 (2003) (“For over two hundred years in 
America, admiralty and maritime claims have been tried to judges, not juries.”).  
 89.  See text accompanying note 60 supra. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
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Or what if Elbonia—like Israel, Lebanon, India, and other places92—
provides that family law matters are to be resolved under the religious laws 
of the religious group to which the parties belong, which necessarily 
involves a form of religious discrimination that would violate First 
Amendment principles if done in the United States? Or what if Elbonian 
rules of evidence give more weight to men’s testimony or to the testimony 
of people who belong to certain religions, and those rules had been applied 
in the divorce?93 
This might be bad, but it’s the reality under which Elbonian law 
operates. Wanda has lived her life in Elbonia based on that reality. She may 
have remarried based on the effect of the divorce, however unfairly her 
divorce proceedings may have been conducted. She may have gotten 
certain property in the divorce, perhaps less than she should have gotten, 
but something that she now views as hers. That was life on the ground in 
Elbonia for her. 
Now Wanda and Harry come to America, and the question of the validity 
of their marriage comes up. Maybe Harry brings it up in trying to get his 
marriage to Wanda annulled (on the theory that the Wanda-Xavier divorce 
was invalid).94 Maybe the government brings it up, for instance in arguing 
that Harry isn’t entitled to claim a spousal privilege to refuse to testify 
against Wanda, or that Wanda isn’t entitled to certain state tax benefits 
offered to married people. Even if we disapprove of the Elbonian legal 
system, American courts shouldn’t just categorically ignore the Elbonian 
divorce in such situations. 
                                                                                                                 
 92. In the former Ottoman Empire states, this deference to the religious laws of the 
parties is called the “millet” system. See, e.g., Yüksel Sezgin, The Israeli Millet System: 
Examining Legal Pluralism [Through] Lenses of Nation-Building and Human Rights, 43 
ISR. L. REV. 631 (2010); see also Mark Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, in Personal Law 
Systems and Religious Conflicts: A Comparison of India and Israel, RELIGION AND 
PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA: A CALL TO JUDGMENT 270 (Geral James Larson ed., 
2001); Lia Pavlou, Shariah Abolished for Greek Muslims, GREEK REP. (Aug. 21, 2011), 
http://greece.greekreporter.com/2011/08/21/shariah-abolished-for-greek-muslims/ (discuss-
ing the recent abolition of a similar system of law in Greece). 
 93. See, e.g., UNC Lear Servs., Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210, 220 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“Experts from both parties agreed that the Board does not give full weight to 
testimony given by women and non-Muslims . . . .”); see also Perry S. Smith, Silent Witness: 
Discrimination Against Women in the Pakistani Law of Evidence, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 21, 23 (2003) (“In Pakistan, and to varying degrees across the Islamic world, testimony of 
women is devalued in certain legal matters and barred in others. . . .”). 
 94. Cf. Siddiqui v. Siddiqui, 968 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 2013) (involving a similar 
controversy). 
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Yet that’s what the text of the ALAC proposal would do. Our 
hypothetical divorce decree was entered under a legal system that denied 
“the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the 
U.S. . . . Constitution[],”95 such as equal rights regardless of sex, or the First 
Amendment right not to be treated differently based on religion. Therefore 
the divorce decree would be “void,” and thus couldn’t be considered by 
American courts. Wanda would thus be treated as still married to Xavier, 
and not to Harry. 
That seems both inefficient and unfair. To be sure, in some 
circumstances, it might be proper for courts to ignore the effect of foreign 
divorces that are based on procedures that American law views as improper. 
For instance, American courts might reject application of foreign law that 
they see as unfair when it affects the rights of people who were U.S. 
residents at the time of the divorce.96 Likewise, American courts may want 
to apply American norms to child custody rights when the children are 
living in the United States. But outside these special circumstances, courts 
shouldn’t categorically ignore the effect of foreign divorces that involve 
departures from American equality norms. 
Perhaps this effect of ALAC is inadvertent, and maybe courts can avoid 
it using some sort of creative legal footwork. Maybe, for instance, courts 
could start more liberally using “putative spouse” doctrines under which (in 
some states) people can be viewed as married in some situations even if 
their marriage was technically invalid in some respect.97 But until that’s 
made clear, the ALAC proposal seems to pose potentially serious problems 
when it comes to determining the marital status of immigrants. 
C. Prohibitions on Actual Violations of State or Federal Laws or 
Constitutions 
Finally, Arizona, Louisiana, and Tennessee have implemented variants 
of the ALAC model that bar the consideration of foreign law or foreign 
judgments only when such consideration would actually violate someone’s 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Model ALAC Act, supra note 71. 
 96. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008). 
 97. “A putative spouse is one thought to be the spouse of another in a marriage, in 
opposition to which there are impediments. Thus, a putative marriage is one in which at least 
one of the parties believed themselves to be married, but because of some encumbrance they 
are not legally married, either by ceremony or common law.” Weaver v. State, 855 S.W.2d 
116, 120 (Tex. App. 1993) (citation omitted). But see id. (“With the exception of equity, 
putative marriages have never been given the same credence as ceremonial or common law 
marriages for the very reason that they are putative: there exists some impediment to the 
marriage. There can be no legal marriage if there is a barrier.”). 
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rights.98 These statutes omit the language asking whether a foreign legal 
system “would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the 
same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the U.S. 
and [State] Constitutions.”99 Instead, they say something like, 
 This chapter applies only to actual violations of the 
constitutional rights of a person or actual conflict with the laws 
of this state caused by the application of the foreign law. . . . 
 A court, arbitrator, administrative agency or other 
adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority shall not 
enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right 
guaranteed by the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States or conflict with the laws of the United States or of this 
state.100 
These proposals are not harmful, I think, but neither are they particularly 
useful. Courts already may not do things that actually violate constitutional 
rights or conflict with other laws. And while courts sometimes indeed 
erroneously violate constitutional rights or other laws, the new rules 
wouldn’t prevent such errors. 
V. Conclusion 
I share some of the skepticism about the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
foreign constitutional norms when deciding American constitutional rules. 
But the state laws that have been proposed to deal with this problem are 
unlikely to do much about it because state laws don’t control the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
Instead, many such state laws are likely to interfere with the perfectly 
proper consideration of, for instance, foreign family law, contract law, tort 
law, and law of judgments, in those narrow contexts in which American law 
has long dictated that foreign law be considered. I hope that legislators, 
regardless of ideological affiliation, recognize the costs of such proposals 
and make sure that they don’t replace one problem with another. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3102 to -3103 (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:6001 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-15-101 to -106 (West 2013). 
 99. Model ALAC Act, supra note 71. 
 100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3102 to -3103. I quote the Arizona language here 
because it is the simplest among this set of statutes. 
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